An Economic Approach to the Self : the Dual Agent by Lotz, Aïleen
MPRA
Munich Personal RePEc Archive
An Economic Approach to the Self : the
Dual Agent
A¨ıleen Lotz
Cerca Trova
15. February 2011
Online at http://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/50771/
MPRA Paper No. 50771, posted 18. October 2013 06:16 UTC
An Economic Approach To The Self :
The Dual Agent
Aïleen Lotz
October 13, 2013
Abstract
This paper extends the notion of the rational agent in economics by
acknowledging the role of the unconscious in the agents decision-making
process. It argues that the unconscious can be modelled by a rational
agent with his own objective function and set of information. The com-
bination of both the conscious and unconscious agents is called the "dual
agent".
This dual agent presents rationally biased behaviors that may not
disappear through aggregation, and could be potentially measured.
It also provides a theoretical approach to the emotionally-driven ac-
tions.
On the social sciences side, the paper pleads for a wider use of sub-
stantive rationality in the understanding of human behavior.
JEL Classication: B41,D01, D81, D82.
1 Introduction
The rational agent hypothesis is at the heart of economic theory. Developed
among the neo-classical school during the middle of the nineteenth century, this
hypothesis states that economic agents are rational, meaning that they choose
their actions in order to maximize their utility. By systematically disregarding
all non-rational behaviors, the theory has allowed economics to abstract itself
from the vagaries of human nature and, as such, has been a powerful tool in the
reshaping of the discipline as a natural science.
While other social scientists were adamant in their quest to model human
nature, economists created a world in which agents are perfectly rational, always
optimize to the best of their knowledge and make no systematic errors.
Critics of this "perfect rational man" have been lurking in the economic
literature for more than 50 years. They rightly point out that models based
on such assumptions have blatantly and repeatedly failed to foresee any market
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crash or other economic disruption from the theoretical equilibrium. They stress
the fact that economics should acknowledge the ndings of other social sciences
and build on them, rather than going on assuming improbable hypothesis.
This stream of criticisms has materialized in the behavioral branches of both
economics and nance, which seek to suggest mathematical alternatives with
rm psychological foundations to rational assumptions.
However, it ignores the fact that psychology su¤ers from its own evils. The
empirical approach adopted by the discipline condemns its theories to be reg-
ularly rejected or amended according to new empirical ndings. Moreover, by
focusing on procedural rationality rather than substantive rationality, it ignores
a convenient way and potentially useful tool to think about the unconscious.
Models based on fully rational microeconomic behavior usually yield results
that are much richer, deeper and more interesting than those achieved by behav-
ioral models. This is probably why despite its grossly caricatural assumptions,
the rational agent is still so much in favor in economics.
If there is some kind of unconscious process undergoing within the psychic
activity, its presence should be fully assessed by economics. If the unconscious
can be seen as a separate agent that has his own set of information, his own
utility and the ability to act in a way distinct from the conscious, then this
agent should be encompassed alongside the conscious agent, and his inuence
should be analysed within the scope of economic theory.
To put things di¤erently, economics may have been wrong in assuming one
monolithic conscious agent. It has gone one step too far in its quest of simpli-
cation, and by assuming that one body should be the home of one rational
mind. It does not follow, however, that its global approach is wrong.
In this paper, we step back and show that the failureof the rational agent
hypothesis to predict irrational behaviors can simply be explained by the omis-
sion of an additional, unconscious agent, within each indivudal.
An other, related contribution of this paper is to explore how economics
can relieve itself from this one assumption of the neo-classical literature, and
consider the economic agent as being composed of two rational agents, the
conscious agent and the unconscious agent.
The paper is structured as follows. The next section presents the general
setup of the model. Introducing the unconscious within an economical model
requires an extensive presentation of the acception of the unconscious agent
we are considering, as well as of his operating process. Section 3 developps
the model : it species the context, the objectives of both the conscious and
unconscious agents, and the resulting action of the combined - so-called "dual"
- agent. Section 4 presents the results of the model. Section 5 puts the results
in perspective. Section 6 concludes.
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2 General setup
This paper will describe two agents, the conscious and the unconscious, and
their possible interactions within a single economic agent. In this section, we
present the general specicities of each of these agents.
2.1 Conscious and unconscious agents
The conscious agent considered here is the neo-classical rational agent. He ap-
prehends the parameters of the reality through noisy signals. He is rational
in the sense that he chooses his actions to optimize his welfare given all the
information at his disposal.
Since this agent will turn out to be quite familiar, I will rather dwell on the
modelisation of the unconscious agent.
2.1.1 General acceptions of the unconscious
In its very general meaning, two type of actions can be qualied as being un-
conscious.
First, actions that are not originating from the conscious mind, but that
punctually emerge to the conscious mind, such as dreams, slips of the tongue,
etc. These actions are conscious, but are said to be unconscious in that they
reect the activity of the Unconsciouspopularized by Sigmund Freud[8]1 .
A second, more straightforward acception of unconscious actions are those
actions that are litteraly un-conscious. They refer to the activity that is de-
cidedly beyond the grasp of the conscious mind. This could refer to a purely
physiologicalor neurologicalunconscious, so to speak, the unconscious that
purely governs our mental and/or physiological processes, such as breathing,
hunger, instincts, reexes, etc.
Relevance of these acceptions If we were to focus on the rst denition
of the unconscious, and exclusively consider the part of the mind that is not
conscious, but can become conscious at some point, we could reduce the eco-
nomic agent to the traditional rational agent, whose perception of reality is only
impaired by his imperfect information about the parameters of the reality.
This is the path followed by behavioral economics. Boots of irrationality are
seen as punctually superseeding the rational agents actions. The "Unconscious"
is taken into account, but not modeled as a rational and permanent agent in his
own right.
Alternatively, if we reduced the unconscious to the second part of the former
denition, i.e. if it were the part of psychic activity beyond the reach of the
conscious mind, the parameters of the reality the unconscious agent could react
to through his action would be radically beyond the knowledge of the conscious
1 I am aware that this statement is a gross simplication of Freuds notion of the Uncon-
scious, and that Freuds own theories have been refuted by various psychoanalytic schools.
However there is no need here to detail this further.
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agent. Both the conscious and unconscious agents could, and would indeed,
coexist in radically independent worlds.
Our purpose would be trivial, the action of the resulting economic (com-
bined) agent being the sum of two distinct and independent actions performed
by two distinct agents, endowed with radically di¤erent knowledge and clearly
dened elds of competence. Besides, in such a context, the action of the un-
conscious would be of slight interest to the economist.
An alternate denition of the unconscious A more economical def-
inition of the unconscious should start with recognizing that unconscious ac-
tions, or the actions of the unconscious agent, are not distinct from those of
the conscious agent.
Whatever the actions these two agents, conscious or unconscious, can take
separately, there is only one physical agent that will act. Therefore we cannot
treat these two agents separately.
The best economical approach should therefore be to describe the uncon-
scious as a second, permanent and fully rational agent, acting alongside the
conscious, yet distinct from the latter in his utility, his perception of reality,
and necessarily constrained in his actions. It is the approach I shall take in this
paper.
2.1.2 Utilities
Should the utilities of the conscious and the unconscious di¤er? Technically
speaking, they should not.
The utility of the unconscious agent The unconscious agents objective is
to optimize the individual wellbeing. This is obvious when, among various other
tasks, he performs all the physiological functions that guarantee the individuals
survival at their best routinely.
This wellbeing is guaranteed on the basis of a body of past knowledge, inher-
ited or acquired through time by the individual. This body of past knowledge
is continuously modied by events, so that it evolves through time.
However, being a mix of genetic heritage, physiological regulatory processes,
instincts, reexes, social conditioning, among other relevant factors, it will be
strongly backward-looking.
The utility of the conscious agent I have just mentioned that the uncon-
scious agent optimizes the wellbeing of the individual. But experience informs
us that this objective is shared by the conscious agent.
Naturally, this often turns out to be a more subjective than objective well-
being. To preserve our health, we should denitely eat less, drink less, drive
more carefully, or quit smoking. But our subjective wellbeing somehow imposes
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that we eat or drink as much as we like of what we like, drive too fast and go
on smoking2 .
Specically, the conscious could, and indeed must, have exactly the same
utility as the unconscious agent.
Survival or wellbeing ? Should the conscious and the unconscious agent
pursue the mere survival of the individual, or his wellbeing? One could argue it
should rather be the individuals mere survival. Yet this would be too limited :
the survival being a wellbeing a minima, it can be seen as the least desirable
of all other preferableoutcomes. Such a setup is, in itself, the guarantee that
the survival of the individual will be, at worst, satised.
The need for further renements So both the conscious and the uncon-
scious agents must have the same utility, the preservation of the individual
wellbeing.
Yet economics predicts that when the same set of information is shared by
two rational agents having the same utility, their actions should be identical. In
order to explain distinct behaviours between the two agents, we must allow for
some di¤erence of information to emerge between the conscious and unconscious
agents.
In this paper, it is not the utility per se that distinguishes both agents, but
the way each agent perceives it respectively, given his information. This will
become more evident by specifying further each agents characteristics and their
resulting grids of lectures.
2.1.3 Functions and grids of lecture
I will assume that the di¤erence in information between conscious and uncon-
scious does not arise from the parameters of the reality, but rather from the
way they are processed by each agent. This directly derives from each agents
function.
Function of the unconscious agent I will suppose that the dening role
of the unconscious is to scan the information  both internal and external -
collected through the body perceptive modes.
The unconscious may then recognize and respond to the parameters col-
lected, before eventually transmitting all or part of them to the conscious.
This setup allows the unconscious to respond to a set of relevant character-
istics before the conscious being even aware of a situation. It also allows for the
conscious to be endowed with most, yet not all, of the parameters of the reality
listed by the unconscious .
This general setup is in line with the current acception of neuronal processes.
2 It might be argued that some want to suppress themselves altogether. This could arguably
and unfortunately be seen as a mere extreme version of the above conducts.
5
Nowadays, the brain is seen as a machine set to represent attributes and
mental objects. Our perceptive modes are a mere collection of mental processes
seeking to extract the relevant information to the representation they are sup-
posed to elaborate. Neuron networks, which share the same encoding informa-
tion properties, then process this information. As such, they constitute repre-
sentational systems of external and internal information.To illustrate this point,
let us analyze two practical examples.
Function of the conscious agent The conscious is able to group and recog-
nize these characteristics, name them, and organize them in multiple subsets
forming one coherent set.
Two practical examples Let us suppose you are standing in front of
a building. This is what your conscious sees. Yet he has only been able to
reach to this conclusion thanks to a recognition process performed by your
unconscious. So that in front of this building, your unconscious has collected a
list of parameters telling him that he is in front of a shape that is static,
big, rectangular, with dark holes, tiles, inhabitants, etc.
Or let us suppose you are stuck in a tra¢ c jam. Your car is at the stop,
just behind a big truck. Once again, this is only what your conscious sees. To
come to this conclusion, your conscious has processed a list of characteristics
provided by your unconscious, stating that there is something, in front of
you, rectangular, equipped with wheels, small mirrors on each side, a
metal platewith a numberwritten at its back, smoke coming from a metal
tube, etc.
From the above lists of characteristics, the conscious extracts the information
that this "thing" in front of you is a buildingor a truck. From the context,
he deduces that these mirrors must be some rear-view mirrors, the metal plate
a licence plate, the metal tube a mu­ er, and that this object in front of you
with its wheels, rear-view mirrors, licence plate, and mu­ er, must be
a truck. Following the same logic, he has deduced that this rectagularand
staticshape, with its roof, wallsand windowsmust be a building.
Implication and limitation The fact that the conscious treats some infor-
mation collected by the unconscious has one important consequence.
It implies that the unconscious agent must be an always operating-agent : its
action must be continuous. This in turn justies the stance taken in this paper.
The very fact that the conscious should be aware of the reality is the very proof
that the unconscious is performing his function : listing the parameters of the
reality, analyzing and transmitting them to the conscious.
However, these sole assumptions are not su¢ cient to induce any di¤erence
between the conscious and unconsciousactions. To induce a real di¤erence be-
tween each agents specic actions, we must suppose that they perceive the same
reality in two distinct ways, and, consequently, treat the incoming information
di¤erently.
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A classical distinction In this paper, the critical di¤erence between the
conscious and unconscious agent lies in their respective perception of time. This
distinction can be drawn from the very role of each agent.
The unconscious agent scans and reacts to parameters of the reality, before
eventually passing on some of this information to the conscious agent.
He is also bound to maintain some specic equilibria within the body on
a permanent basis. Each and every second, vital operations are performed,
that cannot be postponed. Whereas the conscious agent can take time into
account, and delay some of its action, the unconscious agent is bound to act on
a permanent basis, so to speak. So that the laps of time on which each agent,
conscious and unconscious, operate is radically di¤erent, and that we can safely
assume that the unconscious short, medium and long term are innitely shorter
than the conscious ones.
The unconscious role is also to spot and react to potentially harmful situ-
ations, some of which are predened, and some of which are acquired through
mostly early and/or repeated experiences. In order to perform this function, he
cannot discard any element of information. Whereas the conscious agent acts as
a selecting device and tends to discard information once it has been processed,
the unconscious agent never discards what he perceives as potentially relevant.
Two specic agents Two specic and very di¤erent agents emerge from
these assumptions.
In terms of information, the unconscious is clearly more informed than the
conscious. He has access to a much wider and deeper perception of the para-
meters of the reality than the conscious.
Yet it does not follow that the unconscious is better informed than the
conscious. Indeed, the unconscious lacks the "time dimension" associated with
the conscious activity. Naturally, strictly speaking, the unconscious takes time
into account, but his time span is much shorter the the consciousone.
We will therefore treat the unconscious as a "static" agent, and the conscious
as a "dynamic" agent.
This clearly suggests that, although the unconscious presented here can in-
deed be seen as a rational agent, the way it processes its information will trigger
radically di¤erent actions from those of the conscious.
2.2 Mutual awareness
How do the conscious and unconscious perceive one another within the dual
agent? In the present paper, I have supposed that the conscious and unconscious
agents ignore each others presence. This stance requires some explanations.
The conscious agent The conscious is, by denition, the least informed of
the two agents. This directly results from the role of the unconscious, which
scans the parameters of the reality before transmitting eventually some of them
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to the conscious. In this setup, the conscious is bound to ignore many of the
parameters the unconscious is dealing with, and that are specic to his activity.
For example, the conscious will ignore most of the physiological processes
the unconscious is performing constantly. Actually, there is no reason to assume
that the conscious is aware of the fact that an other - and possibly more informed
- agent exists along his side.
The unconscious agent The unconscious is the most informed of the two
agents in terms of scope of information. Yet it does not follow that he is fully
and perfectly well informed. This results from the unconsciousgrid of lecture.
Because the unconscious ignores the time dimension of events3 , he has no reason
to suspect that an alternate grid of lecture exist, nor that the conscious, being
a dynamic agent, should know more than he does.
Two mutually-ignoring agents The overlapping nature of the unconscious
and conscious knowledge - the set of parameters, actions, even utilities, could
lead the unconscious to ignore the consciousaction, and vice-versa. Because the
di¤erence between conscious and unconscious lies within their respective per-
ception of time, they have no reason to suspect that the other agent perception
could be more accurate than their own.
This concludes the presentation of the general setup of the model. I have
specied the unconscious agent modeled here, and shown that he can be seen
as having his own set of information, his own utility, and his own action. He
can therefore be considered as economically rational, and di¤erent from the
conscious agent. I have furthermore mentionned that the conscious agent can
be seen as the neo-classical rational agent. Let me now see how these two
rational agents can be modeled as one single agent, the "dual agent".
3 The Model
I shall from now on call "conscious" and "unconscious" the two rational eco-
nomic agents, and "the dual agent", the individual seen as the combination of
these two agents within a single individual. I will present the context faced by
the conscious and unconscious agents, before specifying their information sets
and utilities. I will then present the full model of the dual agent, along with its
optimization4 .
3Or alternately, because his own actions take place in a much more immediate time dimen-
sion than those of the conscious.
4To simplify the matter, the dynamics of the model is left for further research.
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The reality Conscious and unconscious actions suppose an external situation
in which actions take place. We will call this the "reality". Because we are
modeling rational agents, this reality must be described quantitatively by means
of parameters.
These parameters can refer to various elements: social interactions, sets of
behaviors, agents, costs, external conditions, interactions, all that constitute the
environment the dual agent5 faces, to which he is confronted. The only necessary
condition here is that these parameters can be measured quantitatively, to be
included in the utility function of the agent.
I will call  this set of parameters describing the reality. The reality  is a
vector:
 =(1; :::n) (1)
Each parameter i could actually be seen as a vector of characteristics that
fully describes i. However, this renement is not necessary and will therefore
be ignored.
The conscious The conscious is the familiar rational agent : he chooses his
actions to maximize his wellbeing, to the best of his knowledge. If alone, he
would choose the action that optimizes the wellbeing W :
W (a; 1; :::n) (2)
Note that this wellbeing solely depends on the agents action and the para-
meters of the reality. Were the conscious fully informed, his optimization would
trigger the optimal action aopt. For the sake of simplicity, I will assume this
action to be a linear combination of the parameters of the reality, so that aopt
will be a linear function of the parameters :
aopt =
X
ii
The optimal action is the weighed sum of the parameters of the reality, where
the i can be seen as transformers : they translate the quantitative parameters
of the reality into an action.
Insofar as the conscious is not fully informed, it can at best grasp a mixed
signal of the . This set ~ is dened as:
~ =(1 + "1; :::n + "n) (3)
where the "i are independently and identically distributed.
Benchmark case A benchmark case will be dened as the optimization of
the conscious, if he were the only agent acting within the dual agent6 . Indeed,
if alone, the "conscious" agent would optimize his expectations such that
EcW (a; 1; :::n)
5And of course, the unconscious and the conscious.
6And relaxing the assumption that the parameters of the reality are rst processed by the
unconscious.
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and would therefore set his action such that
a = Ecaopt =
X
iE
ci
=
X
i (i + "1)
= aopt + " (4)
where " is the overall mistake induced by the conscious incomplete infor-
mation:
" =
X
i"1
As mentioned above, this is the standard optimization of the rational agent,
where imperfect information can lead the agent to take erroneous decisions.
The unconscious Recall that, in the present setup, the unconsciousdistinc-
tive role is to list characteristics perceived in the world that surrounds each
individual, i.e. dual agent. He performs this action by collecting the informa-
tion of the bodys various perceptive modes. So that the unconscious does not
perceive the world as the conscious does, but rst and foremost, as a pure list
of parameters.
Besides, because he is a "static" agent, the unconscious, although rational,
signicantly departs from the conscious in his wellbeing. He does not consider
situations as they occur to the conscious, but as a set of small units of mean-
ingfull elements, that he can - and must - recombine and interpret freely, before
comparing them to a specic set of predened "harmfull" situations.
The unconscious must therefore be modeled as an agent reacting to a re-
created and distinct situation from the actual one, so that the situation the
unconscious is facing can be characterized by its own subset of parameters u.
u is dened as:
u = (u1 ; :::
u
n) (5)
These parameters are the set of elements recognized as meaningful by the
unconscious while analyzing the reality.
The unconscious systematically and continuously analyzes the present con-
text and confronts it to his own parameters. In turn, the recognition of part or
all of these parameters within the present context will trigger the unconscious
reaction.
However, because the unconscious decomposes the reality in small units and
interpret them according to his own grid of lecture, these parameters may be
dismissed by the conscious, so that u 6= i 6= .
Conscious and unconscious are therefore endowed with disymmetric sets of
information. The conscious perceives the reality through the fog induced by his
incomplete information, while the unconscious keeps on analyzing the reality
according to a mainly backward-looking grid of lecture.
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Once the u are recognized, the unconscious will seek to maximize a wellbe-
ing Wu = EuW:
Wu (a; u1 ; :::
u
n)
This wellbeing depends on the situation spotted. Here again, because the
unconscious is backward-looking and mostly reacts to past situations, Wu can
be seen as an obsolete wellbeing, inducing actions that actually optimize real
but past situations. His actions are therefore bounded to be suboptimal in the
present context.
The dual agent The combination of the conscious and the unconscious is the
"dual agent".
Being a combination of two agents, this dual agent reacts to two sets of
parameters : the parameters within the reality that are processed by the uncon-
scious, on the one hand, and those signicant to and processed by the conscious,
on the other hand.
Therefore the dual agent will, as a single agent, optimize a combination of
two wellbeings: W and Wu, the wellbeing of the conscious and the unconscious
respectively:
(1  )EcW (a; 1; :::n) + Wu (a; u1 ; :::un) (6)
where  is the weight of the unconscious in the process of choice. I also
assume that Wu is quadratic in the (u1 ; :::
u
n).
Why Game Theory does not apply Stating a single, combined, utility
for two agents may seem awkward. Game Theory would model these two agents
as each having his own action and playing one against the other.
However, in this model, only one agent, the "dual agent", is playing. Yet this
single action must nonetheless be the result of a combination of two utilities,
and two individual and independent actions.
First, because it is unclear whether conscious and unconscious should be
aware of one another. Indeed it is my assumption in this paper that they ignore
one another. Second, because given their respective perception of time, these
two agents have no reason to suspect that their action should be di¤erent.
The dual agents action is therefore the result of the combined actions of the
conscious and the unconscious, and this result cannot - at least in the context
of this paper - be reduced through Game Theory.
Timing Of course, the timing of the action could be rened.
Each agent could act separately or sequentially, and in turn observe the result
of these two actions. Alternately, the unconscious could blur the parameters
of the conscious with his own parameters, thereby modifying the conscious
wellbeing.
11
Yet these situations would be equivalent, and are indeed more conveniently
modeled through a single, dual agents wellbeing, that combines both the con-
scious and unconscious agentswellbeings.
The unconscious as a blurring agent To keep things simple, we have
totally distinguished the conscious and unconscious perceptions of reality. It
would actually be more accurate to consider the unconscious has been able to
blur the perception of the conscious.
This corresponds to replacing the consciousperception of the parameters
~ =(1 + "1; :::n + "n) (7)
by a blurred combination
~
0
=(1 + 1
u
1 + "1; :::n + n
u
n + "n) (8)
In this context, an analysis would lead to a net gain of information for the
conscious, by re-establishing the true signals ~:
The parameter  The parameter  describes the "power of intrusion" of
the unconscious in the dual agents utility.
When  = 0; the action boils down to the standard benchmark case, in
which the dual agent is the rational, conscious, agent.
When  6= 0; the higher the , the more permeable the dual agent action
is to the unconscious analysis of the reality, or alternatively, the more does the
reality t the unconscious grid of lecture.
 is therefore dependent on the parameters  and u, and in turn, on the
personal history of the dual agent. As such, it can evolve over time.
Formally, the action taken is thus a combination
a = (1  )Ecaopt +  +
X
i
u
i
= (1  )  aopt + "+ X iui
= (1  )  aopt + "+  X iui   aopt
= aopt + (1  ) "+ 
X
(i
u
i   ii) (9)
Let me now examine this equation in detail and presents the results of the
model.
4 Results
Equation 9 shows that the action of the dual agent can be broadly dened as
being the sum of two terms : an optimal social action, and a bias to this optimal
social action.
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The optimal social action The rst term, aopt, is the optimal action the
conscious would have chosen had he been the sole agent involved, and had he
been fully informed of the reality. It can be dened as the "optimal social
choice".
The bias The last two terms taken together, (1  ) " + P (iui   ii),
can be seen as an overall bias to this optimal social choice.
Terms of the bias The rst term of the bias, (1  ) ", is the usual white
noise.
It is unavoidable and results from the usual consciouslack of information
about the parameters of the reality. It represents the overall noise that blurs
the consciouschoice, and produces a sub-optimal and totally random outcome.
The second term of the bias, 
P
(i
u
i   ii), represents a pure action
of the unconscious. Unlike the rst term of the bias, it is not random, and
represents a systematic bias with respect to aopt.
Because the unconscious optimizes a reward, this term should not be sub-
optimal. Yet the reward of the unconscious, Ru, does not merely optimize the
real, actual situation faced by the agent, but rather a set of past - or "atemporal"
- situations reactivated by the present situation. It only seldom represents an
optimal action vis-à-vis the present situation, as seen by the conscious, but
should rather be seen as an e¤ective loss for the conscious. Its impact on the
dual agents action will depend on the weigh given to Ru within the dual agents
optimization.
To the dual agent however, this bias is part of his optimization, and cannot
be seen as a loss. It is nonetheless ine¢ cient on a social point of view, as being
biased toward past personal events.
Nature of the bias What is the exact nature of this bias? The rst
intuition is that it results from and represents combinations and di¤erences
between, on the one side, parameters seen by the conscious and, on the other
side, parameters seen by the unconscious.
While the parameters of the conscious are real and observable, the parame-
ters of the unconscious are, at least partly, discarded or unobservable to the
conscious, since by denition the ui are projections of the unconscious on the
parameters i. 
u
i is therefore the result of an interpretation performed by the
unconscious and, as such, uncomprehensible to the conscious. Besides, the i
are the translators of this intepretation into actions.
This overall bias can therefore be dened as an action performed by the dual
agent, directly observable to the conscious. It is a departure from the optimal
action, in that it would not necessarily be required from the situation as such.
The conscious does not control it, since it is induced by an unconscious activity,
and is the result from the "overinvestment" or "misinterpretation" of a present
situation by the unconscious.
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The emotive part of the agents action The very broad denition of
this bias has a huge impact on the result of the paper, and will be discussed
later on.
Let me underscore that if this bias can be a material action, it is not neces-
sarily bound to be so. It could very well be an immaterial action. It could be
a slip of the tongue, for example, but it could also be a thought, an emotion, a
feeling, an exclamation, etc.
Although it might not be fully adequate, let me for now call it "the emotive
part of the agents action".
Estimation of the bias This bias could be observable and quantitatively
estimated. Recall however that the hypothesis of an imperfectly informed con-
scious does not a priori allow him to suspect the presence of a bias in his opti-
mization.
Without prior knowledge of the unconscious, the conscious would deduce
ex post - after revelation of the true parameters - that a suboptimal action re-
sulted from his misestimation of the situation measured by (1  ) ". Repeated
mistakes could lead him to the conclusion of a lack of estimation power.
However, the presence of the systematic bias 
P
(i
u
i   ii) could be
measured by the correlation of the mistakes in a series of similar situations.
Indeed, measuring the average of his actions through an extended period
of time and over a large sample of similar actions could lead him to eliminate
random errors and measure an average action
a = aopt + 
X
(i
u
i   ii)
Ex-post, when aopt is revealed, the systematic bias could be measured.
We can even venture that the ui could be partly retrieved. By examining the
biases over a su¢ ciently large sample of events, one could retrieve, a minima,
some structural similarities among various situations, and postulate a struc-
tural form for a set of ui . This would help determine the form of the triggers
inducing the unconscious reaction. However, this would, given our description
of the parameters and the relevance of their structural interactions, require to
abstract oneself from the contingencies of the present situation, and rather seek
similarities within situations.
Last but not least, this bias in the action of the dual agent will not necessarily
disappear when aggregating over agents. It will depend on the nature of the
bias. Actually, if its trigger is a common scheme among individual, and not a
personal feature, it will sum up over a population. This can give some rationale
to some common seemingly irrational behaviors.
The following section briey discuss and put in perspective these results.
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5 Discussion
This paper innovates in showing that the action of two purely rational agents
optimizing their own utility function within a single individual - the dual agent
- results in an a perfectly optimal, rational action, and a bias to this rational
action.
I shall briey underscore the discrepencies between the dual agent and be-
havioral approaches, before detailing the impact of the paper depending on our
assessment of the nature of the bias.
5.1 Dual agent vs. behavioral approach
It could be argued that this paper conrms the behavioral approach. After all,
it suggests that realistic behaviors can, on an ad hoc basis, be decomposed into
one optimal action and a bias, which is the exact stance taken by behavioral
economics.
However, the dual agent approach departs from the behavioral one in many
respects.
At the root of the dual agents approach lies the conviction that, to be
understood, a phenomenon needs to be considered rational, in the economic
sense of the term. So that whereas behavioral economics will choose singularity
over rationality, empirics over theory, and psychology over economics, the dual
agent approach will take the opposite stance.
Singularity vs. Rationality While the behavioral approach chooses to pre-
serve the traditional concept of a single agent and nuances his rationality ac-
cording to a collection of empirically observed biases, the dual agent approach
drops the assumption of a single agent governed by a single conscious, but opt
for a full rationality of both agents.
Empirics vs. theory While the behavioral approach chooses to amend the
theoretical economic rationality according to empirical ndings, the dual agent
approach seeks to determine the theoretical conditions under which two fully
rational agents could be rational at the same time.
Economics vs. psychology While the behavioral approach sees the uncon-
scious as being beyond the scope of rationality, the dual agent approach suppose
the unconscious to be fully and economically rational.
And while the behavioral approach chooses to use psychology to inform
economics, the dual agent approach shows that economics can inform psychology
and, as we shall see later on, psychoanalysis.
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5.2 An economic approach to the theory of choice
According to H. Simon7 , economic rationality, the assumption that actors max-
imize subjective expected utility, supplies only a small, and often not essential,
part of the premises in economic reasoning.
The remainder of theses premises, auxiliary empirical assumptions about
actors utilities, beliefs, expectations, to be made correctly, required, in his
words, "an empirically founded theory of choice". This theory of choice in turn
needed to specify what information decision makers use, and how they actually
process it.
This has been the approach taken here. Considering the unconscious as a
rational agent alongside the conscious in a simple model required to specify his
information, and how he could process it.
To be understood, the unconscious must necessarily be seen as schematically
unique and rational. If he is indeed rational, but still di¤ers from the conscious
in his action, then it must be that he sees alternate features within the same
reality. This, in turn, means that he must process them di¤erently.
The economical approach presented here establishes a minimal framework for
the description of the unconscious as a rational agent. It provides a convenient
way to establish and validate empirical psychological assumptions. This is the
standard scheme in which a quantitative theory can make predictions that can
be tested later on.
5.3 An economic approach to irrationalbehaviors
Two purely rational agents optimizing their own utility function within a single
individual - the dual agent - resulted in an a perfectly optimal, rational action,
and a bias to this rational action.
The rational behavior The optimal action is the perfectly rational action.
It is the accurate reaction of the dual agent to the parameters of the present
reality. It is an action that is unbiased, and that perfectly responds to the
parameters of the reality.
Actually, it is the standard reaction that everybody should adopt when con-
fronted to the parameters of the reality. Given the same preferences and envi-
ronment, we should all react to them in the same rational way.
The irrational behavior The second part of the action is a bias to this
perfectly rational and optimal action. Being a bias to a rational action, it will
be seen as irrational.
Of course, in the present setup, this bias is not irrational per se, since it
reects the action of the unconscious agent, who is rational in his own right.
However, it is not factuallyoptimal, since it bears the mark of the uncon-
scious perception. Indeed, it results from the di¤erence of information between
7See Simon [22]
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conscious and unconscious, and reects the discrepancy that arises between mere
facts, and the way we are interpreted by the unconscious via our own personal
history.
Nor is it relevant to the present situation, since it reects a mainly backward
looking grid of lecture. It can therefore seem irrational, since it does not respond
accurately to the parameters of the reality.
So that this apparent irrationality naturally follows from our assumptions,
more specically from the conscious and unconsciousrespective grid of lecture.
5.4 An economic approach to emotions
Recall that the bias has been dened as an action performed by the dual agent,
directly observable to the conscious but not controlled by him.
The emotive part of the action
Emotion It should be clear from the above that this perfectly ts the
notion of emotion. Indeed, we do not "control" our emotions. Actions taken
under emotional stress are most of the time seen as "biased", and "irrational".
So that except for a few specic situations, emotions can be seen as being a
bias to the optimal rational and action rather that part of the rational action
itself, that should mainly be emotionless.
Cognition We do not control our emotions, but neither do we control
our thoughts. And, as a matter of fact, few thoughts are absolutely devoid of
emotive content. Our thoughts are highly dependent on our personnal history.
Behaviors Arguably8 , the main di¤erence between economists and emo-
tion theorists lies in the fact that economists mainly try to explain behavior,
whereas emotion theorists try to explain emotions.
This model does not distinguish between behaviors and emotions. Both
could be part of the optimal, rational action. When facing a danger, it could
be optimal and rational for any individual to be scared (emotion) and run
(behavior). But other, more complex, situations could involve an innity of
behaviors or emotions, that would not necessarily be justied rationaly.
So that emotions and behaviors could be part of both the rational action,
and of the bias, and as such be explained by the introduction of a second agent,
the unconscious, endowed with an alternate and specic grid of lecture of the
reality.
8See Elster [7].
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On individuality and collective unconscious Given a certain environ-
ment, we should all react to it in the same rational way. The optimal, rational
action is unique, up to a white noise.
On the contrary, the bias encompasses all the features that consitute our
personality : our thoughts, feelings, habits, tastes, etc. It is highly personal :
actually, it is what sets us as pure, unique individuals.
However, the bias will not disappear through aggregation, since most of these
phenomena can be induced by unconscious collective schemes. The economic
activity or decision process being necessarily a part of psychic activity, one
cannot distinguish one from the other.
A alternate look on emotion regulation A open question in human a¤ec-
tive neuroscience today is to determine whether emotion regulation is a specic
process, or if it is inherent to the emotion process.
Because the bias encapsulated the di¤erence of information between con-
scious and unconscious, this model suggest that it will be regulated once the
information gap will be lled, i.e. when the bias will be so strong that the
information of the unconscious will be heard by the conscious.
Example We have all experienced ts of anger. How does anger evolve?
At rst, it is manageable. We reason ourselves. However, if the source of our
anger does not disappear, we will eventualy utter it out. We will shout until, at
some point, our anger will disapppear by magic.
The present model suggests that the anger is caused by a perception of the
unconscious, is encapsulated in the bias to the rational action. When uttered
out, the perception of the unconscious is explicitely
5.5 An economic approach to social interactions
The way we interact with others crucially depends on our perception of their
behaviors.
The way we perceive othersactions How do conscious agents perceive
other peoples action ? The answer is straightforward. As conscious agents,
we perceive them as a mix of action, some of them fortunate, some others
unfortunate. Among all these actions, some will be intended, some other will be
unintended, may they be good or bad. Our conscious will be able to distinguish
the active, intended part of othersactions, and di¤erentiate it from what must
be unintended.
But if we admit that conscious and unconscious ignore one another, how
could the dual agent perceive other peoples action?
Here, two cases can arise: either the unconscious perceives himself as "om-
nipotent" within the dual agent, or he perceives his action as modied by the
conscious agent acting along his side.
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One unconscious interacting with other unconscious If the unconscious
believes that he alone - as the best informed agent - decides every single action,
controls everything within the mind of the dual agent, then he must consider
the behavior of others as being the pure optimization of a single, and perfectly
rational agent, i.e. a fully "conscious" unconscious agent.
In this case, he will never see othersactions as a "pure accident". He will
never see the bias in the others behavior as unintended or irrational. He will
rather treat it has being part of a wider optimization, that has a purpose, and
even more so, is of critical importance to the others utility.
One can infer from this that an unconscious perceives othersactions, what-
ever they may be, as fully intentional, and being part of their utility.
One dual agent interacting with other dual agents Alternately, if the
unconscious knows he is not alone, he also knows that his action will be a bias
within the dual agents action. And by observing the biases of other peoples
actions, he can rightly interpret the biases in their actions has being driven by
their unconscious.
He could easily infer, from every departure from purely rational actions, the
revealed preference of the othersunconscious, and act in consequence.
Whatever the option taken, it should be obvious that the individual factual
irrationality is by no means an irrational behavior to the dual agent.$$$
5.6 An economic approach to psychoanalysis
The royal road to the unconscious The simple model presented here sug-
gests that the most part of the unconscious activity takes place alongside the
conscious activity, on a permanent basis. Basically, any material or immaterial
action that departs from the pure rationality can be seen as bearing the mark
of the unconscious.
Assessing the unconsciousaction Considering the agent as a dual-agent
would allow the observer to infer that, for any action that is both sub-optimal
and systematicly biased towards a specic outcome, this very bias is the sign of
the unconsciousoptimization.
Indeed, if for every action of the dual agent is a such that:
a = aopt + 
X
(i
u
i   ii)
there is a bias 
P
(i
u
i   ii) to the optimal social agents action, aopt.
To simplify the matter, whenever an action is associated with an emotion,
this emotion could be analyzed as a bias induced by the unconscious agent
within the dual-agents action. Emotions are both the sign of the unconscious,
and its rst means of expression.
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Dealing with the unconscious action The bias resulting from the op-
timization of the unconscious is indeed observable by the conscious. It can
therefore be dealt with.
Compensation If the dual agent could, with time, understand that he is
facing a systematic bias in his actions, he could use this bias to overweigh his
actions and compensate the unconscious bias. This approach does not imply
any knowledge of the un, but requires a constant e¤ort to compensate for the
bias, that is constantly recreated by the unconscious9 .
Rationalisation A second approach would be to reduce the weigh of the
unconscious within the optimization.
How can this be achieved? A system of trial and error could lead to guess
the ui lying behind the unconscious optimization. This is the very purpose of
an analysis, whether it is a psychoanalysis or other forms of personal analysis.
Reinterpreted in the context of this model, the purpose of such an analysis
would be to inform the unconscious that his grid of lecture is not adapted to
the actual context.
Retrieving the parameters of the unconscious Providing a method-
ology to actively and deliberately reduce the bias would prove our point by the
same token, and if need be, validate our hypotheses. This requires some further
hypothesis, and is left to be presented in a future paper.
This could be done by reducing the expression (i
u
i   ii), the di¤erence
of information between the conscious and the unconscious agents.
We can venture that, should emotions be regressed against the proper set of
ui , they could be totally suppressed.
So that, if the rudimentary hypotheses of this model are correct, the royal
road to a knowledge of the unconscious activities of the mind should not be
dreams, as Sigmund Freud suggested10 , but rather this emotive part of human
activity, as revealed by the bias of the dual agents optimization.
6 Conclusion
Modeling the unconscious as a second agent acting alongside the neo-classical
rational "conscious" agent has proved to induce a bias in this "dual agent"s
optimization. This bias, although rational and optimal under the dual agents
perspective , is actually sub-optimal with respect to the actual context. Insofar
as it is generated by predetermined collective schemes, it could persist despite
aggregation.
The dual agent framework represents an alternative to the economic agent,
and allows to consider its actions under a psychological angle. It provides a useful
9This ever-going correction is reminiscent of time inconsistency in monetary economics.
10See Freud [8].
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theoretical framework to analysing emotionally-driven outcomes. Alternatively,
it allows to consider psychological processes under an economical point of view.
The concepts that have been discussed here allow for a certain amount of ex-
tensions, both on theoretical and empirical grounds. On the theoretical side, the
most obvious and immediate extensions are the introduction of dynamics, and
interaction between conscious and unconscious, respectively. On the empirical
side, tools to measure the bias in the dual agents action should be developed.
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